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Extensive-Form Games: Strategic Moves
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Extensive-Form Games: Strategic Moves
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Now · Commitment
Extensive-Form Games: Strategic Moves
Commitment
A commitment is a binding promise or threat that constrains future choices. By limiting one's own options, commitment can improve outcomes.
Example: Burning bridges — an army that destroys its own escape route commits to fight, deterring attack.
Strategic Moves (Schelling)
| Move | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Threat | Promise to punish if opponent acts a certain way | "If you enter, I'll lower prices" |
| Promise | Commitment to reward cooperation | "If you collude, I will too" |
| Warning | Statement about what you'll do in your own interest | Non-credible threats are warnings |
| Assurance | Commitment to cooperate if opponent does | Mutual cooperation |
Mixed Strategies in Extensive Form
Mixed strategies in extensive-form games specify probability distributions over actions at each information set. Behavior strategies specify independent randomization at each information set; mixed strategies randomize over pure strategies. Kuhn's theorem: in games of perfect recall, they're equivalent.
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